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Abstract
The ability to generate innovations and capture the rents from innovation are important for firms’ competitive advantage. 
Increasingly firms seek knowledge abundant locations, or industry clusters, to access novel knowledge and generate 
innovations through knowledge recombinations (Schumpeter, 1934). We examine how different types of clusters impact 
on the innovation output, the knowledge flows among the clustered firms and, ultimately, on who captures the rents 
from innovation. The type of cluster reflects the configuration of firms and the interactions among firms, individuals and 
agencies in the cluster and is likely to be a major driver of both the innovative output and of which firms will be more 
likely to capture the rents from innovation. Extant research has noted that the social and business networks binding firms 
in clusters are excellent vehicles for the flow of knowledge that eases innovations, but different types of clusters may lead 
to different outcomes. 
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However, despite the now long debate on the role and ben-
efits of clusters and the equally extensive work on innova-
tion, with a handful of exceptions the extant research has 
largely failed to probe on the actual innovation output ges-
tated in clusters and on the firms that capture the returns 
from the innovations (see also Ferreira, et al., 2012). For 
instance, industry clusters do not have a common configura-
tion (Markusen, 1996; Romanellii and Khessina, 2005) and 
it may be that different types of clusters impact differently 
both the innovative output and the innovators’ ability to 
capture the benefits from the innovations.
In this paper we seek to complement and extend previous 
research on industry clusters and innovation. In specific we 
focus on how the different types of clusters – for which we 
use the typology advanced by Markusen (1996) - influence 
the rate and type of innovations and which firms will be 
more likely to capture the rents from innovation. Specifically, 
we suggest that we need to look into the characteristics 
of the cluster to observe how the flows of communication, 
information and knowledge and workers occur among firms 
co-located. If not all clusters are alike it seems reasonable 
that no single answer exist. The implications of this study 
extend to firms, since they are concerned with appropri-
ating the benefits from their innovations, to public policy 
makers in designing policies to promote cluster formation 
and thus it does matter the type of cluster promoted, and 
to managers in deciding whether to locate, or not locate, in 
each type of cluster.
This paper is organized as follows. First, we review relevant 
literature on innovation and on industry clusters, namely 
highlighting the argument that clusters are locations of un-
usually high innovation activity. Then, we move to present 
Markusen’s (1996) typology of industry clusters to discuss 
how different types of clusters are likely to have differenti-
ated impact on the innovation output and on which firms 
will be more likely to capture the future returns accruing 
from innovation. We conclude with a broad discussion, impli-
cations and presenting avenues for future scholarly inquiry.
Innovation, rents and clusters
Firms across the world strive to innovate as innovation out-
puts are the sources of future returns. In this paper we take 
Schumpeter’s (1950) and Henderson and Clark’s (1990) def-
inition of innovation as any (re)combination of existing and/
or new resources and/or technologies that have the poten-
tial to generate rents for the entrepreneur. Levin, et al (1987: 
783) also noted that “[t]o have the incentive to undertake 
research and development (R&D), a firm must be able to ap-
propriate returns sufficient to make the investments worth-
while”. Schumpeter (1950) suggested that it is through in-
novation that firms renew their assets base, and Amit and 
Introduction
Contemporary research has been placing knowledge as the 
core source of firms’ competitive advantage and competi-
tion among firms as relying increasingly on knowledge and 
innovation (Grant, 1996; McGrath, et al., 1996; Teece, 1998, 
2000; Argote and Ingram, 2000; Tallman, et al., 2004; Mae-
hler, et al., 2011). Firms may develop knowledge and innova-
tions in a number of different manners. They may develop 
internally new business and R&D capabilities, acquire it from 
competitor firms through acquisition of an incumbent firm, 
or absorb it from external agents. One stream of research 
that has continuously developed over the past fifty years has 
dealt with industry clusters, or agglomerations, as locations 
of excellence to absorb novel knowledge (Pinch, et al., 2003; 
Tallman et al., 2004; Saraceni and Andrade Júnior, 2012). This 
line of research may probably be traced back to Marshall’s 
(1920) work and had grown into a substantial number of 
scholars questioning why and in which conditions similar 
firms, or firms operating in the same industry co-locate. 
Firms cluster geographically to benefit from the availability 
of a quality labor pool, complementary industries and ser-
vices and suppliers, and to access knowledge flows that fa-
cilitate the gestation of novel ideas (Krugman, 1991). Indeed, 
to generate more innovations and absorb knowledge not 
yet held, firms seem to increasingly seek to locate in knowl-
edge rich regions (Saxenian, 1994; Pinch, et al., 2003), such 
as many industry clusters around the world. The examples 
of such clusters are plentiful, in the more diverse industries 
and countries, but Silicon Valley in the US, the Formula one 
cluster in the UK, the tiles industry in Italy, the oil cluster in 
Houston, US, and the financial centers of London, in the UK, 
and New York, in the US, the Port wine cluster, in Portugal, 
are probably among the best known cases. Several regions 
and countries in the US, Europe and other regions follow 
industry cluster-based development strategies.
Extant research on industry clusters has advanced remarka-
bly over the last decades. Most notably, research on clusters 
and on the national innovation systems has clarified many 
benefits of co-location, or proximity, the potential for traded 
and untraded dependencies, and scale and scope economies 
that build on Marshall’s (1920) original ideas. Extant research 
has also focused on public policy implications namely delv-
ing into how creating industry clusters may be a mechanism 
to revitalize regional and national economies and modern-
ize the industrial structure (Krugman, 1991; Porter, 1998). 
On entrepreneurship, scholars have noted that clusters are 
often rich spots for new firms foundation (Rocha, 2004; Fer-
reira, Tavares and Hesterly, 2006). Broadly, this research has 
had a few common elements and especially the focus on the 
firms’ and the entrepreneurs’ networks (Saxenian, 1994; Bas, 
Amoroso and Kunc, 2008).
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per, as a set of firms operating in an industry, and related 
activities, located in geographical proximity in a region and 
with possibly extensive interactions which has the poten-
tial benefit of augmenting the firms’ competitive advantages 
and improving the economic development of the region. 
Rosenfeld (1997: 10) defines a cluster as “a geographically 
bounded concentration of similar, related or complemen-
tary businesses, with active channels for business transac-
tions, communications and dialogue, that share specialized 
infrastructure, labor markets and services, and that are faced 
with common opportunities and threats”. Krugman (1991), 
Porter (1998) Shaver (1998), among several other scholars, 
have shown that there are significant benefits from cluster-
ing of firms in a delimited geographic space, following Mar-
shall’s (1920) work on economic externalities. Doeringer 
and Terkla (1995: 225) argued that the sole definition of 
industry clusters is “geographical concentrations of indus-
tries that gain performance advantages through co-location” 
(italics added). Porter (1998) conceives clusters as a con-
centration of related firms, suppliers, service providers and 
institutions connected to a certain industry, that are tied by 
common externalities that emerge from being embedded in 
a cluster. The clustering benefits accrue from the concentra-
tion of competitive and cooperative firms in related activi-
ties, up and downward the value chain, in a certain location 
(Saxenian, 1994; Porter, 1998).
Krugman (1991) noted that clustering benefits have ele-
ments of a self-perpetuating system due to the industry 
growth in that area that makes it ever more attractive for 
other firms to co-locate (see also Driffield and Munday, 
2000). These benefits emerge on the form of agglomeration 
economies that may entail specialized factor inputs, supply 
of intermediate products and access to infrastructures (see 
also the work by Marshall, 1920; Porter, 1990). Other ben-
efits of clustering may be characterized using institutional 
theory (Meyer and Rowan, 1977) and may be described as 
a quest for legitimacy. What it means is that by clustering in 
known clusters in a certain expertise firms may benefit from 
reputation, status and legitimacy spillovers, in addition to the 
knowledge or technology spillovers that take place due to 
the mobility of works and the social and business interac-
tions among agents (Jaffe, et al., 1993, Saxenian, 1994; Porter, 
1998; Ferreira, et al., 2006; Ferreira, et al., 2012). Finally, the 
benefits accruing from the relative abundance of resource 
endowments (Marshall, 1920; Wheeler and Mody, 1992; Sara-
ceni and Andrade Júnior, 2012).
Clustering advantages are likely to be important in the con-
text of innovation, technological changes, and the appropri-
ation of rents accruing from R&D and innovation efforts. 
Porter (1998, 2000), for instance, argued that it is the com-
petition between rival firms in the cluster that drives growth 
because it forces firms to be innovative, improve and create 
Schoemaker (1993) that the inimitable, idiosyncratic assets 
are the basis of the firm’s competitive position. Innovation 
thus, and specifically the ability to innovate and benefit from 
it, is essential in the competitive arena. Moreover, innovation 
ability is a primary source of competitive capacity.
However, innovating per se is not sufficient and firms need 
to capture the benefits from innovation to succeed and 
continue innovating (Bowman, 1974; McGrath, et al., 1996). 
Under conditions of “imperfect appropriability” firms will 
under-invest in new technologies, with well-known impli-
cations for welfare and economic development. Extant re-
search has mainly focused on the issue of appropriation of 
rents by emphasizing the speed of imitation by rivals (as per 
Schumpeter, 1950; Teece, 1998, 2000; Gould, 2012; Ferreira, 
Serra and Maccari, 2012). In this view, firms’ failure to cap-
ture rents from their innovations would be simply a function 
of both the ease of replication and the efficacy of protection 
mechanisms as barriers to imitation. Studies departing from 
this perspective emphasize the speed of imitation by com-
petitors. The speed of imitation by competitors is a func-
tion of several characteristics: (a) potential rate of return of 
the innovation (depicted as the incentive to imitate by Hill, 
1992), (b) effectiveness of the protection mechanisms such 
as patents (or barriers to imitation, according to Hill, 1992), 
(c) rivals’ ability to imitate (Hill, 1992) or their skills, rou-
tines, (Nelson and Winter, 1982), resources (Barney, 1991), 
and complementary assets (Teece, 1986, 1997), (e) rivals’ 
technological relatedness (or technological distance, Tall-
man and Phene, 2002), (f) competitors access to the details 
and knowledge involved in the innovation, (g) nature of the 
knowledge involved in the innovation (e.g., tacit or explicit, 
Winter, 1987; Polanyi, 1967), and (h) ease of transfer of the 
innovation and/or knowledge across organizational bounda-
ries (Kogut and Zander, 1992, 1993; Maehler, et al., 2011).
Research on industry clusters is thus largely limited to not-
ing how each of these factors is compounded when the in-
novator firm is located in an industry cluster. Hence is it 
worth noting that while clustering may favor innovation, 
clustering may also be an inappropriate decision for the ap-
propriation of the rents from innovation (Pouder and John, 
1996; Breschi, 2000). It is likely that when embedded in a 
network of social and business relationships with other 
firms, which is typical of co-located firms (Saxenian, 1994; 
Porter, 1998, 2000), the innovator may find it more arduous 
to appropriate the full returns that accrue from innovation. 
Moreover, the configuration of the cluster itself may matter 
in this equation.
Innovation in clusters
Clusters, also called industry clusters, industrial districts or 
geographic agglomerations, are conceptualized, in this pa-
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velopment of a skilled labor force in related industries, and 
the social infrastructure. However, the same network ties 
that bind clustered firms and ease innovation also contrib-
ute to make knowledge a semi-public good, hindering the in-
novator firm from keeping the innovation internalized, thus 
impeding the innovator from capturing the full rents from 
its innovation.
What this traditional scrutiny does not do is to consider 
how the types of clusters matter for this dynamic. How-
ever, it seems reasonable to suggest that in some types of 
clusters there may not exist the same form of collaborative 
and "neighboring" environment. Furthermore, some clusters 
are clearly dominated by one firm over others, and extant 
research has not introduced how different power balances 
may partly drive both the innovative output and firms’ rela-
tive ability to capture innovation rents. In the following sec-
tion we use Markusen’s (1996) typology of clusters to sug-
gest a complementary interpretation of these phenomena. 
In doing so, we will use rather extensively and freely from 
Markusen.
Types of clusters and innovation
The extant research has to some extent overlooked that 
there are various types of clusters and each type actually 
entails profoundly different configurations, forms of collabo-
ration and competition among firms co-located. It is likely 
that the innovation output and the hazards in appropriat-
ing the rents differ among types of clusters. That is, when 
focusing on industry clusters and understanding innovation 
and rents, we may need explanations that are beyond the 
speed of imitation by competitors. To each type of cluster 
corresponds a different model of organization of firms, who 
are the dominant firms, the type of ties connecting firms, the 
strength of the ties among entrepreneurs and employees 
operating in the cluster, forms of governmental intervention, 
and so forth. We thus now turn to discuss how these char-
acteristics are important for the innovation output and the 
ability to capture the rents from innovation.
In this paper we use Markusen’s (1996) distinction of four 
types of industrial districts: the marshallian and Italianate 
type, the hub-and-spoke, the satellite industrial platforms, 
and the state-anchored clusters. This typology is particularly 
suited for our analysis since Markusen’s descriptive typol-
ogy specifies various criteria such as (a) the configuration of 
firms, (b) internal or external orientation, or the embedded-
ness of firms within their cluster and with agents outside the 
cluster, (c) governance structures, (d) the role of the state, 
(e) the role of large firms, and (f) extent of cooperation and 
types of business relationships. These criteria are well suited 
for our ensuing analysis. Notwithstanding, it is worth noting 
at the outset that there are other typologies, that there may 
new technology. Pouder and John (1996) refer to clusters as 
‘hot spots’ of unusually high entrepreneurial activity, stimu-
lating R&D and the introduction of new skills and services. 
One of the most highlighted features of clusters is the social 
interaction and inter-firm cooperation in the cluster (Sax-
enian, 1994; Doeringer and Terkla, 1995; Jacobs and DeMan, 
1996; Porter, 1998; Driffield and Munday, 2000; Balbinot et al., 
2011). In terms of competition and maintenance of knowl-
edge in-house, the clustering of firms presents interesting 
challenges. Verspagen (1999), for example, noted that the 
most important element in innovations developed in clus-
ters is the social and business networks binding employees, 
managers and firms. Through networking with other firms, 
with both different and complementary specializations, the 
innovative potential increases and more innovations are 
likely to be gestated. Clustering increases the likelihood of 
knowledge spillovers (both intended and unintended spillo-
vers) among clustered firms (Jaffe, et al., 1993; Ferreira, et al., 
2012). Thus, the potential for new innovations is likely to be 
higher within clusters, where various firms are located and 
multiple resources, knowledges, and capabilities come into 
contact, than outside clusters. In sum, all these arguments 
and the received wisdom seem to point out to the reason-
ing that clusters are areas of munificent innovation. Or in a 
broad proposition forms: firms in clusters are more likely to 
be more innovative than firms that are not clustered, or in 
a cluster.
Appropriating rents in clusters
The social and business interactions that promote innova-
tion in clusters may also make it harder for firms to protect 
their knowledge. According to Ferreira, Serra and Maccari 
(2012), co-located firms may face higher obstacles to the ap-
propriation of innovation rents. Conversely, firms that are lo-
cated outside the cluster, and thus more isolated from rivals, 
may find it more difficult to develop innovations, but once 
developed they will probably be able to keep knowledge in-
house, maintaining secrecy and preventing unintended trans-
fers of knowledge. In the clusters, these knowledge transfers 
occur rather naturally through the repeated interaction of 
employees, owners, managers and scientists (Pouder and 
John, 1996). It is this ease in the appropriation of returns 
from innovation for firms outside clusters that may have led 
to some conclusions that the best firms do not benefit from 
co-location (e.g., Shaver, 1998; Pouder and John, 1996).
The rationale here exposed, see also a recent work by Fer-
reira, et al. (2012), would lead to a proposition that could be 
spelled out in a quite straightforward manner as: the innova-
tor firms are less likely to appropriate rents accruing from 
innovation if they are located in a cluster, than if located out-
side the cluster. In sum, clusters promote innovation through 
the technology and knowledge transfer among firms, the de-
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outside the cluster, at least in Marshall’s original formulation 
(albeit newer version of the Marshallian clusters have been 
formulated – see, for instance, Bellandi, 1989; Sforzi, 1989; 
Bull, Pitt and Szarka, 1991). Furthermore, a high degree of 
cooperation among competitor co-located firms who share 
risks, costs, and innovations and an idiosyncratic local cul-
ture are major traits of this type of cluster. Inter-firm co-
operation in these clusters does not need to be purposeful, 
rather it emerges from proximity and because of the flow of 
workers between firms.
This type of cluster poses many indications that there will be 
frequent small product and process innovations, originated 
in the social and business interactions among small and in-
novative firms. Most notably the employee mobility across 
firms in the region make knowledge resemble a "local public 
good" – as Markusen (1996: 299) expressed “the secrets of 
the industry are in the air”.
In terms of capturing the rents from innovation the situ-
ation is far more complex. First, small firms are less likely 
to protect their innovations through patents. Second, the 
innovations are often small and fairly explicit - they involve 
minor adjustments to the product or process, and the inno-
vator is unable to extract additional rents from clients. Third, 
when the innovations are more "visible" it is possible that 
the social control mechanisms allocate a substantial share 
exist variants within each of the four types of clusters and 
that other competing typologies of clusters will probably 
draw from many of the features that Markusen’s typology 
entails. That is, while we use Markusen’s typology, it is likely 
that most of the exiting classifications hold many common 
features. For instance, Enright (2000) put forward a typol-
ogy of five cluster types: working or overachieving clusters; 
latent or underachieving clusters; potential or wannabe clus-
ters; Policy driven clusters; and ‘Wishful thinking’ clusters.
Markusen’s (1996) four types of clusters are briefly charac-
terized in the following table.
Marshallian clusters
The Marshallian industrial districts are seemingly the most 
well studied types of clusters, mostly because these corre-
spond to Marshall’s (1920) view and are the most abundant 
type in Europe; where there is a long tradition of studying 
regional clusters and innovation systems and policies. The 
Marshallian clusters are composed of multiple small, innova-
tive and locally-owned firms that are deeply embedded in 
local and regional ties to other co-located firms in a broadly 
cooperative governance system, which favor their survival 
and adaptation. The intra-cluster exchanges are dense and 
the employees move frequently across firms but within the 
cluster. In fact, these firms do not have many ties to firms 





Marshallian Many small, innovative, medi-
um- sized and locally-owned 
firms well embedded in the 
regional social dynamics.
Substantial inter-firm trans-
fers, joint R&D efforts, pool 
of assets for fulfilling clients’ 
orders, in a milieu munificent 
in institutional support.
Dependent on the dynamism 
of the cluster given external 
evolutions. Regional entre-
preneurship.
Hub-and-spoke One, or a few, large firm – 
possibly oriented to external 
markets - that is surrounded 
by many small suppliers and 
service provider firms.
Large firm(s) dictate the 
terms of the business rela-
tions with the smaller firms 
in the surroundings. Few in-
teractions among spoke firms 
that are focused on their ties 
to the hub firm.
Dependent on the evolution 
and success of the large hub 
firm(s).
Satellite Driven by branch-plants – 
possibly subsidiaries of large 
multinationals.
Low level of inter-firm con-
tact and very limited inter-
firm ties in the cluster.
Depends on the growth of 
the branch plants and the 
success of the public policies 
adopted to attract more 
firms.
State-anchored A government owned or sup-
ported, usually not for profit, 
entity surrounded by related 
suppliers and service firms.
The anchor institution is 
central to the majority of the 
inter-firm ties but there may 
coexist significant exchanges 
among co-located firms. 
Depends on the public policy 
and the relative ability of the 
anchor institution to attract 
additional political support 
and funding.
Table 1. Markusen’s typology of clusters
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important are the ties of these firms to firms outside the 
cluster, even because the regional economy cannot absorb 
but a small part of these firms output.
Innovation in these clusters is mainly driven by the hub 
firms. These are large firms that have the capacity to patent 
any significant innovation to protect the property rights and 
that have the financial resources to enforce their rights. Fur-
thermore, the employees’ mobility is fairly low. Hence, the 
distinguishing feature of the Marshallian clusters - the ex-
tensive inter-firm cooperation and intended and unintended 
knowledge transfers - is absent from the hub-and-spoke 
type of clusters. Without employees exchange, knowledge 
flows considerably less between firms. In this type of cluster, 
the dominant hub firm is more likely to have developed in-
house the innovation or to have it contracted in the market, 
but keeping any rights to potential future benefits. Therefore, 
it is likely that the hub firms will be able to capture the rents 
from innovations, whether these innovations were gener-
ated in-house or by a small, and non-dominant, supplier.
Proposition 2.a. The dominant firms in hub-and-spoken-type 
clusters are likely to drive the innovations generated, wheth-
er they are developed in-house or by other independent 
firm in the surrounding milieu.
Proposition 2.b. The dominant firms in hub-and-spoke-type 
clusters are likely to appropriate the majority of the rents 
from innovation, regardless of whether they developed the 
innovations.
Satellite platform clusters
The satellite platform clusters consist of an “assemblage of 
unconnected branch plants [subsidiaries of multinational 
firms] embedded in external organizational links” (Markusen, 
1996: 293). Often these types of clusters are the outcome of 
public policy measures to attract foreign multinational cor-
porations. These may be high-technology firms or firms that 
seek to exploit the low cost of local resource endowments 
(e.g., labor) but are generally large, foreign-owned subsidiar-
ies of multinational corporations. The case of the clustering 
of unrelated research facilities of large multinational cor-
porations in the Research Triangle Park, in North Carolina, 
in the US, is an example of this type of cluster (Markusen, 
1996).
The satellite platforms are dominated by large and almost 
completely externally oriented firms. These firms have mini-
mal intra-cluster exchanges in favor of stronger ties to the 
parent headquarters and other sister subsidiaries elsewhere. 
Therefore, firms located in satellite-type clusters are fairly 
detached from local agents. Hence, the source of knowledge 
for the innovations is likely to be developed in-house and 
of any additional rents to the innovator. Fourth, because the 
firms in the cluster share a similar architectural knowledge 
(Tallman, et al., 2004) they have similar absorptive capacity 
and are easily able to understand and implement small inno-
vations. Nonetheless, the expectations for inter-firm coop-
eration (see the work on open innovation by Gould (2012) 
and Lewrick, Raeside and Pelsi, (2007) on the innovators’ 
networks) are likely to apply also in terms of sharing rents 
from innovation, and hence it is not likely that the innovator 
will capture more than a "fair" share of any innovation rents.
Hence, the high degree of inter-firm cooperation and the 
social expectations for firms’ behavior regarding the sharing 
of costs, risks and innovations, render that rents from inno-
vations will be shared by the firms in the cluster.
Proposition 1.a. Marshallian-type clusters are likely to gener-
ate essentially small product and process innovations.
Proposition 1.b. Firms in Marshallian-type clusters are likely 
to appropriate a small part of their innovation rents that are 
shared with the other firms in the cluster.
Hub-and-spoke districts
The hub-and-spoke type clusters have one, or a few, domi-
nant and externally oriented firms surrounded by multiple 
smaller suppliers. Two well documented examples of this 
type of cluster include Seattle, in the US (Boeing) and Toyota 
City, in Japan (Toyota). Albeit the specific configuration of 
this type of cluster may vary (see Markusen, 1996, for a dis-
cussion) the dominant firm(s) have extensive ties to suppli-
ers, competitors and clients outside the cluster. Moreover, 
employees’ mobility is substantially lower than in the Mar-
shallian type, and the hub firm imposes the terms of the 
exchanges with the local spoke firms. For example, Dyer 
and Nobeoka (2000) noted how Toyota assumes a dominant 
position and controls the flow of resources in the region. 
Furthermore, the innovations generated seem to be specifi-
cally tailored to Toyota’s needs and to at least some extent 
driven by Toyota itself, even if Toyota is not the innovator. 
Rather Toyota brokers the transfer of technologies between 
firms from which it is able to capture a share of the rents.
In this type of cluster the central hub firm(s) is surrounded 
by many small firms over which it exerts a dominating posi-
tion and market power that allows it to tie clients and sup-
pliers in long-term contracts. When more than one domi-
nant firm resides in the hub-and-spoke cluster, such as is the 
case in Seattle, in the US, where three large multinationals 
- Microsoft, Boeing and Weyerhauser - coexist, there may be 
a low degree of cooperation among dominant firms in shar-
ing risk and costs of innovations. However, it is likely these 
dominant firms will be tied by supply ties, where, for exam-
ple, Microsoft serves Boeing with tailored software. Most 
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anchored by the military or research-driven organizations 
and agencies, while others will be less knowledge demand-
ing, such as those anchored by governmental bureaucracy 
(take the Brazilian case of its capital city Brasília, or Washing-
ton D.C., in the US. The examples of this type of cluster may 
extend to different activities such as cities that grow around 
Universities, such as Coimbra, in Portugal, or Montpellier, in 
France.
Determining who is more likely to appropriate the rents 
from innovation in this type of cluster seems fairly complex. 
A number of scenarios may be put forth but let us focus on 
one. When the anchor is, for example, a research defense 
facility and the innovator a small to medium firm, whether it 
is co-located or not, the rents from incremental innovations 
will tend to be short lived but appropriated by the innova-
tor firm. In these situations, the diffusion of the innovation 
within and outside the cluster prevents the innovator from 
assuring a continuous stream of rents. Possibly the innova-
tion was developed by contract to the research defense fa-
cility. Radical innovations are more likely to be developed 
in-house by the anchor firm or legally contracted out. In ei-
ther case, the anchor firm is more likely to retain the rights 
to the innovation and be able to protect it from unintended 
diffusion for a longer period of time. The above discussion 
permits us to formulate the general propositions that:
Proposition 4.a. Firms in state-anchored-type clusters are 
likely to generate innovations that are specific to the anchor 
institutions and the innovators will be the anchor or a legally 
contracted firm.
Proposition 4.b. The anchor firms in State-anchored -type 
clusters are likely to appropriate the majority of the rents 
from innovations.
Discussion and concluding remarks
According to Schumpeter (1950) innovation results when 
different combinations of existing assets are found to have 
superior benefits and come to replace prior dominant com-
binations. Innovation is an for firms’ competitive ability and 
is the mechanism through which firms gain access to re-
sources with (superior) positive future value, and to valuable 
new resource combinations that are specific to the firm and 
that it alone may exploit (McGrath, et al., 1996: 390). How-
ever, innovation is also becoming increasingly dependent on 
the interaction among independent firms that contribute 
with complementary resources (Breschi, 2000; Balbinot, et 
al., 2011). Because the knowledge needed for innovations 
is increasingly distributed across organizations and geog-
raphies, firms need to expand to access both idiosyncratic 
business- and idiosyncratic location-specific knowledge. 
Firms thus seek to access knowledge not yet held by locating 
not require local content, rather it comes from the head-
quarters and sister subsidiaries through the exchanges of 
personal within the corporation that facilitates the recombi-
nation of knowledge acquired in multiple sites in the world. 
Interestingly it is reasonable to suggest that these firms may 
generate a substantial amount of innovations. Many of these 
branches were set up with a research purpose. Given that 
these firms are largely stand-alone operations, with scarce 
exchange flows with other co-located firms, imitation is 
more difficult. Hence, we suggest that in these instances, it is 
the innovator that will appropriate a very large share of the 
rents accruing from innovation.
While we addressed a specific type of satellite platform clus-
ter – the research-oriented type - some satellite platforms 
have no research purpose whatsoever. For example, the re-
gion of Manaus in Brazil flourishes based on tax benefits. 
However, we should also point out that in these cases, in-
novation and appropriation of rents from innovation are not 
a concern.
Proposition 3.a. Firms in satellite platform-type clusters are 
likely to generate innovations independently in-house or 
with other sister subsidiaries.
Proposition 3.b. Firms in Satellite platform-type clusters are 
likely to appropriate the full rents from their innovations.
State-anchored clusters
The fourth type is one of the most interesting types of clus-
ters to examine since it is often acclaimed by governments 
as a developmental path. Public officials often seek to pro-
mote clusters - state-anchored clusters - through location 
decisions of a major research center, a university, a military 
base, and so forth. These clusters are centered on one, or 
more, public institutions that anchor the local economic ac-
tivity. The nature and scope of the local economic activity is 
determined by, and dependent on, these anchor institutions, 
and the cluster’s characteristics will vary substantially ac-
cording to the type of institution located. A myriad of sup-
pliers may emerge around these large organizations, with 
which they establish short-term contracts. Given that these 
anchors are government-funded institutions, decisions may 
come from outside the region or be dependent on public 
policy choices and political shifts. In addition, ties of these 
large institutions to clients and suppliers tend to be of a 
local nature (albeit not necessarily) and involve such instru-
ment as local content requirements.
This type of cluster is very diverse, and its characteristics 
and innovative dynamism will depend on which is the anchor 
organization. Some clusters will possibly require more in-
novations and be more knowledge intensive, such as those 
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share the rents. Examining how holding the complementary 
assets impacts on the appropriation of rents is a possible 
future research avenue and one that may involve employing 
the Resource-Based View of the firm (Barney, 1991).
In many instances innovations are developed in collaborative 
efforts in clusters. Thus, firms collaborate to pool together 
essential complementary assets to develop and to exploit 
the innovations. The fact is that collaborative efforts may 
came at the cost of losing a share of the future rents from 
innovation. It is even possible that some firms gain a bargain-
ing position if they hold crucial complementary assets. For 
example, the North American IBM held a dominant position 
because of its large sales network and financial capital, not 
due to its technological strength (Verspagen, 1999). Assess-
ing how holding the complementary assets to exploit in-
novations may shed additional insights into our discussion.
When advancing a set of propositions on who captures in-
novation rents we are implicitly assuming that either the in-
novators do not seek to protect their innovations, that they 
are not able to do so, or that the legal mechanisms (such as 
patenting) fall short of providing effective protection. For 
innovators to be able to capture the innovation rents the 
protection regime and mechanisms need to be effective and 
trustworthy (Teece, 1997, 1998, 2000). We thus need to un-
derstand each of these scenarios. For instance, small firms 
may not patent their innovations due to the costs involved. 
Firms may not patent when their inventions were developed 
through contract (which is likely to occur in some state-
anchored clusters). And, more broadly, it is reasonable to 
suggest that clustered firms may not patent because patent-
ing required making tacit, complex and systemic knowledge 
explicit which actually eases invent around behaviors and 
unintended knowledge transfers (Levin, et al., 1987; Teece, 
2000). One of our core assumption in this regard is that the 
social and business interactions that characterize clusters 
also make it more difficult to keep secrecy of any innova-
tion. Levin et al (1987), for example, argued that patents are 
not good protection mechanisms because of the ability of 
competitors to “invent around” them. Conversely, if the in-
novator firm is able to patent and effectively protect the 
knowledge, then the innovator will possibly be rewarded 
with rents. However, as Winter (1987) stated, patenting pro-
vides effective protection in only a few cases and industries 
(Levin, et al., 1987; Teece, 2000).
For public policy makers our paper raises several issues 
that must be assessed. First, the need to understand which 
types of clusters may hold the benefits aimed at. Different 
types of clusters are likely to have different impact on the 
regional and national economy and the creation of jobs. Per-
haps more important is to design and implement effective 
legal and regulatory norms that promote and protect in-
in knowledge munificent clusters. However, not all clusters 
are alike and while some clusters may indeed favor knowl-
edge access and innovations, other types of clusters do not. 
Why? Because the patterns of interaction among clustered 
firms, entrepreneurs and employees are not identical across 
all clusters. In addition, the institutional framework is also 
rather differentiated across clusters, as is the importance of 
dominant firms and governmental intervention.
Innovation is increasingly a social phenomenon and not the 
outcome of individual actions and strategies by isolated 
firms (Breschi, 2000). Many innovations are actually the out-
come of pooling together different resources and bits of 
knowledge. Thus, it is likely that firms’ ability to innovate is 
influenced by the spatial proximity to others, external sourc-
es of knowledge. However, the same dynamics that render 
the flows of knowledge among firms also makes it more 
difficult for the innovators to appropriate the rents from in-
novations. When relating to clusters and the co-location of 
firms in a region, the social and business interactions often 
give knowledge a quasi-public good nature.
When dealing with industry clusters as particularly innova-
tive environments due to the well-known proximity among 
firms in related and supporting industries, universities, re-
search centers, and an array of other dedicated institutions, 
we need to truly understand how innovation occurs and 
why should clustered firms endeavor in R&D efforts. Cer-
tainly, as recently put forth by Ferreira, Serra and Maccari. 
(2012) firms will only have an incentive to innovate if they 
are able to capture the rents from their innovations. Not-
withstanding, we propose in this paper that different cluster 
types will render rather dissimilar prospects in two distinct 
matters: the innovation output and rent capture by firms in 
the cluster. The fact is that on occasion, the firms that will 
most likely capture the rents may even not be the innova-
tors but rather other firms in the surroundings. That is most 
likely the case in Hub-and-spoke cluster, where the domi-
nant firms are in better position to appropriate rents, but 
also in the state-anchored clusters, where it is the anchor 
firms that will probably capture those rents. These proposi-
tions are especially important for location decisions and call 
for a better assessment by managers of the regional configu-
ration when deciding whether to locate, or not, in a given 
industry cluster.
Our discussion on the impact of type of cluster does not 
diminish the importance of other factors that may be ex-
plored in future research. For example, we implicitly as-
sumed that the innovator firm was able to exploit the in-
novation. However, it is possible that the innovator lacks the 
complementary assets (Teece, 1986, 1997) to do so and, in 
fact, to capture even a small share of the rents from its in-
novation it may need to collaborate with other firms, and 
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